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Are We Only Burning Witches? The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996's Answer to
Terrorism
JENNIFER A. BEALL*

INTRODUCTION

Almost a year to the day after the tragedy in Oklahoma City,' President Clinton
signed into law the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA" or "the Act"). 2 Upon signing the AEDPA President Clinton stated,
"It stands as a tribute to the victims of terrorism and to the men and women in
law enforcement who dedicate their lives to protecting all of us from the scourge
of terrorist activity."3
In its haste to calm the fears of the nation, the U.S. government may have
practiced the "politics of the last atrocity."4 Congress and the President may have
too willingly sacrificed the individual liberties and freedoms guaranteed by the
Constitution for a quick "solution" to terrorism.5 Similar reactions in times of
crisis are not unusual,6 but hindsight reveals how unnecessary, damaging, and

* J.D. Candidate, 1998, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S., 1995,
Indiana University. I thank Professor Lauren Robel for her helpful comments and suggestions
throughout each stage of this Note. Special thanks to my family whose love, support, and
encouragement should be a model for every family. This Note is especially dedicated to the
memory of my grandfather, Dr. Joseph A. Dowd.
1. On April 19, 1995, a bomb exploded outside the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, killing 167. See Thomas C. Martin, Note, The Comprehensive Terrorism
PreventionAct of 1995, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 201, 201-02 (1996).
2. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214. President Clinton signed the AEDPA on April 24, 1996.
3. President's Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, 32 WEEKLY Cow. PREs. DOc. 719, 721 (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter President's
Statement].
4. CounterterrorismLegislation: Hearingson S. 390 and S. 735 Before the US. Senate

Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. and Gov't Info., 104th Cong. 61 (1995) (testimony of Father
Sean McManus, President, Irish National Caucus) (urging U.S. Senate not to engage in the
"politics of the last atrocity"). Father McManus urged Congress not to take advantage of the
bombing, "the last atrocity," by trying to score political points. Id. He warned, "Destroying
constitutional rights is not the way to build a memorial to the dead in Oklahoma City, nor is
it the way to protect Americans from terrorism, nor is it the way to fight terrorism." Id
5. See Joseph D. McNamara, Editorial, Bombs andthe Bill ofRights, WALL ST. J., May
5, 1995, at AIO (pointing out that probably none of the suggested antiterrorism legislation
would have prevented the Oklahoma City bombing). The article concludes, "It would be ironic
if anti-terrorist legislation helped destroy the protections of our Constitution and turned the
delusions of the paranoids into reality." Id
6. See generally Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516 (1951) (upholding
convictions under the Smith Act for conspiracy to organize the Communist Party of the United
States for the purpose of advocating the necessity of overthrowing the government "as speedily
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drastic they can be.7 As Justice Brandeis pointed out, in the past,"[m]en feared
witches and burnt women."8
This Note argues that lawmakers may have once again sidestepped the
Constitution, at a time when the public is too traumatized and outraged to realize
the consequences.9 The fundamental rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights must
not be curtailed under the guise of national security. 0 Terrorism is a serious
challenge, but by abandoning the freedoms of speech and association and the
right to due process, we are giving in to terrorists." Part I lays out the AEDPA's
legislative history and major provisions. Part II places the current legislation in
historical context by examining the country's battle between the Constitution and
the fear of Communism in the first half of this century. Then, Part III examines
the AEDPA's ban on fundraising and its implications for free speech and
association. Finally, Part IV examines due-process concerns that arise from the
Act's deportation provisions.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE
AEDPA
Although eventually spurred on by the Oklahoma City bombing, the AEDPA
is a culmination of several U.S. bombings and the bills proposed by the President
and members of Congress as a result of those bombings. President Clinton first
introduced antiterrorism legislation in February of 1995, approximately two
months before the tragic incident in Oklahoma City. 2 That legislation, the
Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995," 3 was a response to the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing in New York City. One week after the Oklahoma City

as circumstances would permit"); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding
the constitutionality of the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II).
7. Donald M. Haines reminded Congress of this:
Who on this Committee, or in this Administration, would now defend the forced
removal, relocation and internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II?
That action still stands as a shameful blot on our image of America as a fair
country-even though that action was supported by virtually all the executive
branch and congressional leaders of the day and, moreover, was popular with the

voters.
Terrorism in the UnitedStates: The Natureand Extent of the Threat andPossibleLegislative
Response: HearingsBefore the Senate JudiciaryComm., 104th Cong. 163 (1995) [hereinafter
TerrorismHearings](statement of Donald M. Haines, Legislative Counsel, ACLU).
8. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (warning
about irrational fears concerning Communism).
9. In unsettled times, "[tihe majority may be willing to accept broad, vaguely defined law
enforcement powers when the minority's constitutional rights are at stake, but the tools used
against 'them' today can easily be turned against 'us' tomorrow." Note, Blown Away? The Bill
ofRights After Oklahoma City, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2074, 2091 (1996).
10. See Terrorism Hearings,supra note 7, at 163 (testimony of James X. Dempsey, Deputy
Director, Center for National Security Studies).
11. See id.
12. See President's Statement, supranote 3, at 719.
13. S. 390, 104th Cong. (1995).
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bombing, on April 26, 1995, the President presented an expanded version of the
bill to the Senate and urged quick action. 4
The following day, April 27, Senators Bob Dole and Orrin Hatch introduced
a similar bill, the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995.5 With
overwhelming bipartisan support, this bill passed through the Senate within two
months of the bombing on June 7, 1995.6 The debate lasted only four days in the
Senate, 7 but the bill was stalled in the House until a modified version finally
passed on March 14, 1996's as the first anniversary of the bombing quickly
approached.
Probably not coincidentally, the final conference-bill version passed through
Congress on April 19, 1996, the first anniversary of the Oklahoma City
bombing. 9 President Clinton signed the AEDPA into law on April 24, 1996.20
The Act's stated purpose is to "deter terrorism, provide justice for victims,
provide for an effective death penalty, and for other purposes."'" The AEDPA is
composed of nine titles covering a wide scope and amending numerous sections
of the UnitedStates Code.22
While this Note will focus on several of the antiterrorism provisions of the
Act, other provisions have received attention from authors and the courts or
deserve mention.' One significant and controversial provision revises federal
25
habeas-corpus procedures24 by establishing a one-year statute of limitations,

14. See S. 761, 104th Cong. (1995); Martin, supra note 1, at 210-19 (providing a detailed
explanation of the legislative history of S.761 and S. 735).
15. S.735, 104th Cong. (1995).
16. See Melissa A. O'Loughlin, Note, Terrorism: The Problem and the Solution-The
Comprehensive TerrorismPreventionAct of 1995,22 J. LEGIs. 103, 106 (1996). The vote was

91 yeas to 8 nays. See 141 CONG. REc. S7857 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
17. See Martin, supranote 1, at 205.
18. See Effective Death Penalty and Public Safety Act of 1996, H.R. 2703, 104th Cong.;
141 CONG. REC.H2267 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1996) (passed 229-191); Note, supra note 9, at
2075.
19. See Robert Plotkin, FirstAmendment Challenges to the Membership and Advocacy
Provisionsofthe AntiterrorismandEffective Death PenaltyAct of 1996, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.

623, 625 (1996) (stating that bill passed with few changes).
20. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
21. Id. at 1214.
22. The titles cover such areas as habeas-corpus reform, justice for victims, international
terrorism prohibitions, terrorist and criminal alien removal and exclusion, nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons restrictions, implementation of plastic-explosives convention, criminallaw modifications to counter terrorism, and assistance to law enforcement. See id.
23. This discussion is not meant to be exhaustive but only to point out a few other areas
addressed by the Act.
24. See generally President's Statement, supra note 3, at 720 ("I have long sought to
streamline Federal appeals for convicted criminals sentenced to the death penalty."); Martin,
supra note 1,,at
233-40 (discussing the proposed reform before the Act passed).
25. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 101, 110 Stat. at 1217 (amending
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (1994)).
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restricting federal habeas-corpus review of state-court decisions,2 6 and severely
discouraging second or successive petitions.27 Another notable provision is for
victims, and includes mandatory victim restitution for certain offenses" and
closed-circuit television proceedings for victims when venue has been changed.29
The great force behind the AEDPA lies in those provisions relating to terrorist
activity; consequently, those provisions are the focus of this Note. First, Title III
of the Act criminalizes financial contributions that are made to designated
terrorist organizations, whether or not they are made for the peaceful or
otherwise legal activities of the group. 0 Second, in Title IV, alien-terroristremoval procedures provide for the use of secret and illegally obtained evidence
in deportation hearings?' Under Title IV, deportation can be based solely on
membership in one of the designated organizations defined in Title 111.32 Finally,
this Note will consider the criminal alien-removal provision of Title IV which for
certain criminal aliens mandates detention, leaving no discretion to the Attorney

General, pending a deportation hearing.33
II. PAST REACTIONS TO ANTIGOVERNMENT ACTIVITY: THE
GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO COMMUNISM
In order to understand the future impact of the AEDPA provisions that will be
discussed in detail in Parts III and IV, it is important to look back at a similar
time of fear and overreaction:
Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest the conviction of these
Communist petitioners. There is hope, however, that in calmer times, when
present pressures, passions and fears subside, this or some later Court will

26. See id. § 104(3), 110 Stat at 1219 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2254). This section provides
that the writ may only be granted when the adjudication of the claim in state court: "(1) resulted
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law... or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id.
27. See id. § 106(b), 110 Stat. at 1220-21 (amending 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)) (requiring
successive petitions to be approved by a court of appeals panel and to be based on newly
discovered evidence or new constitutional rights established by the Supreme Court and
retroactively applied, and further requiring for a successive habeas petition that the facts, when
viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, establish by clear and convincing evidence that no
reasonable fact finder would have found the person guilty).
In Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996), the Supreme Court considered whether §
106(b)(3)(E) was an unconstitutional restriction on the Court's jurisdiction. The Court held that
"although the Act does impose new conditions on our authority to grant relief, it does not
deprive this Court ofjurisdiction to entertain original habeas petitions." Id. at 2337.
28. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act §§ 201-211, 110 Stat. at 1227-41.
29. See id. § 235, 110 Stat. at 1246-47 (applying when venue has moved out of state and
over 350 miles away).
30. See infra notes 59-105 and accompanying text. The Act also criminalizes assistance to
terrorist states in §§ 321-330 but those provisions are not discussed further in this Note.
31. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 401, 110 Stat. at 1259-60
(establishing removal court and procedures); infra notes 106-40 and accompanying text
32. See infra note 131.

33. See infra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
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restore the First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where they
belong in a free society.34
American fear and persecution of Communists began in the early part of this
century and continued for at least fifty years with arrests, prosecutions, and
deportations.35 By 1919, the majority of states had enacted some combination of
"red flag" laws, "criminal syndicalism" laws, or anarchy and sedition laws? 6 The
federal government also had amended the Espionage Act of 1917 with the
Sedition Act of 1918. 37
The first of many unsuccessfu 3 81constitutional challenges reached the Supreme
Court in 1919.39 In upholding the defendants' convictions under the Espionage
Act, the majority admitted that "in ordinary times the defendants in saying all
40
that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights.
In 1940, the federal government enacted the Alien Registration Act (the "Smith
Act") 41 to directly regulate political speech. 42 One provision stated that an alien
could be deported based on past beliefs, advocacy, or membership in an
organization that advocated forcible overthrow of the government.43 The key
provision made knowing membership in any such organization illegal with a
penalty of up to twenty years imprisonment."
The top eleven Communist Party leaders in the United States were convicted
under the Smith Act.45 The Supreme Court in Dennis upheld the convictions for
conspiring to organize the Party for the purpose of advocating and teaching the
46
overthrow of the government "as speedily as the circumstances would permit.
The defendants were convicted merely for joining "together to advocate a
doctrine," with no proof of "imminent danger.' 1 7 In dissent, Justice Black stated
that "the only way to affirm these convictions is to repudiate directly or

34. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
35: See generally Marc Rohr, Communists and the First Amendment: The Shaping of
Freedom ofAdvocacy in the Cold War Era, 28 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 1 (1991) (providing a
detailed history of the evolution of Communism and the First Amendment).
36. See id. at4.
37. Sedition Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-150, § 3,40 Stat. 553, 553-54 (making it a crime
to utter language intended to bring the United States government into contempt, scorn, or
disrepute) (repealed 1921).
38. Of approximately 2000 prosecutions under the Sedition Act, about 900 were convicted.
See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 97 (1992).
39. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding convictions for causing
and attempting to cause insubordination in the military and naval forces based on defendants'
distribution of leaflets to enlisted men opposing World War I and the draft).
40. Id. at 52.
41. See Rohr, supranote 35, at 7.
42. See id. at 10.
43. See id at 11-12 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1982), which consolidated the 1940 statute
and other sections into one statute).
44. See id. at 11 (explaining how the Alien Registration Act included advocacy and
organization as illegal).
45. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
46. Id. at 516.
47. WALTER GELLHORN, AMERICAN RIGHTS 75-77 (1960); see also Rohr, supranote 35,
at 58-59.
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indirectly the established 'clear and present danger' rule."4 He continued, "The
[First] Amendment as so construed is not likely to protect any but those 'safe' or
orthodox views which rarely need its protection. 49
Several more repressive laws were.enacted during the 1940s and 1950s.5° In
1947, the Attorney General published a list of subversive organizations. 5
Finally, over President Truman's veto, Congress enacted the detailed and
comprehensive McCarran Act in 1950.52 The McCarran Act required the
registration of all Communist Party members, prohibited any Party member from
working in a defense facility, holding office with a labor organization, or, among
other things, obtaining a passport, and sometimes required the deportation of past
or present Party members.53 In Communist Party of the United States v.
Subversive Activities ControlBoard, the Supreme Court upheld the McCarran
Act and an order requiring the Communist Party to register, despite First
Amendment right-to-association and due-process challenges.54 In yet another
dissent, Justice Black stated:
I regret, exceedingly regret, that I feel impelled to recount this history of the
Federalist Sedition Act because, in all truth, it must be pointed out that this
law-which has since been almost universally condemned as
unconstituional-did not go as far in suppressing the First Amendment
freedoms.., as do the Smith Act and the Subversive Activities Control Act.55
Finally, in 1960, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the
membership clause of the Smith Act. 6 By reading specific intent as to the
criminal ends of the organization and active membership into the requirements
for conviction under the Smith Act, the Court by a 5-4 margin upheld a
conviction for membership.57 In his dissent, Justice Douglas cited a passage
which provides a good summary of the history discussed in this Part, and the
lessons that should be remembered when considering Parts III and IV:

48. Dennis,341 U.S. at 579-80 (Black, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 580 (Black,J., dissenting). Although Yates v. UnitedStates, 354 U.S. 298 (1957),
did not overrule Dennis, it limited Dennis by holding that "[tihe essential distinction is that
those to whom the advocacy is addressed must be urged to do something, now or in the future,
rather than merely to believe in something." Id. at 324-25 (emphasis in original).
50. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 94 (1986). "It is a sobering fact that
even the ACLU succumbed to the rabid intolerance of the 1940s and 1950s by purging
suspected Communists from its official hierarchy and by assisting the FBI in identifying
'subversives."' Id.
51. See Rohr, supra note 35, at 12.
52. See id at 13-14.
53. See Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367
U.S. 1, 4-19 (1961) (setting out the pertinent portions of the McCarran Act as amended by the
Communist Control Act of 1954).
54. See id at 103.

55. Id. at 159-60 (Black, J., dissenting).
56. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1960) (upholding the constitutionality of a
clause that made the acquisition or holding of knowing membership in an organization which
advocates government overthrow by force or violence a felony).
57. See id. at 209, 228.
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The perils sought to be suppressed are regularly overestimated. History shows
in one example after another how excessive have been the fears of earlier
generations, who shuddered at menaces that, with the benefit of hindsight, we
now know were mere shadows. This in itself should induce the modem
generation to view with prudent skepticism the recurrent alarms about the
fatal potentialities of dissent.... [T]he lovers of freedom cannot afford to
sacrifice their moral superiority by adopting totalitarian methods in order to
create a self-deluding sense of security. Suppression, once accepted as a way
of life, is likely to spread."
Regretfully, as the following discussion will demonstrate, Congress did not heed
Justice Douglas's warning or learn from our history of overreaction. Suppression
has spread through many provisions of the AEDPA, affecting the rights of
American citizens and legal resident aliens.
III. THE AEDPA's FUNDRAISING BAN AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
The AEDPA criminalizes financial contributions to any organization
designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the Secretary of State.59 This
means that a U.S. citizen can be imprisoned for up to ten years for making
political contributions," even if he is contributing only to the legal, peaceful
activities of the organization. 6 ' There is absolutely no requirement that the
government prove an individual had the specific intent to advance the illegal
aims of the group through his contribution.62 Prior to the AEDPA this type of
peaceful, humanitarian support was expressly protected in the Violent Crime

58. Id. at 274-75 n.8 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing GELLHORN, supra note 47, at 83).
59. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
303(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1250-53 (amending 18 U.S.C. by adding § 2339B). Section 303(a)
provides:
(1) UNLAWFUL CONDUCT.-Whoever, within the United States or subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States, knowingly provides material support or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization... shall be fined ... or imprisoned not more than 10 years,
or both.
Id. § 303(a), I10 Stat. at 1250. "[Material support or resources" is defined as "currency or
other financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, safehouses, false documentation
or identification, communications, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical
assets, except medicine or religious materials." Id § 323, 110 Stat. at 1255 (amending 18
U.S.C. § 2339A (1994)).
60. See id. § 303(a), 110 Stat. at 1250.
61. See TerrorismHearings,supra note 7, at 161 (testimony of James X. Dempsey, Deputy
Director, Center for National Security Studies).
62. The Ninth Circuit, considering the First Amendment in the deportation context, recently
stated that "targeting individuals because of activities such as fundrasing is impermissible
unless the government can show that group members had the specific intent to pursue illegal
group goals." American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 119 F.3d 1367, 1376 (9th
Cir. 1997), petitionfor cert.filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3523 (U.S. Jan. 30, 1998) (No. 97-1252).
Although this decision was not premised on the AEDPA, it seriously questions the fundraising
provision's constitutionality. See William Claibome, New Antiterrorism Law Suffers Legal
Setbacks; Appeals Court Rejects Palestinians'Deportation,WASH. POST, July 11, 1997, at

A18.
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Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 for First Amendment reasons. a This
Part argues that the fundraising ban is an unconstitutional restriction on free
speech and association."
In Buckley v. Valeo, 65 the Supreme Court established that attempts to regulate
financial-campaign contributions implicate the First Amendment. In the Court's
words, "virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society
requires the expenditure of money. 66 Contributing to an organization is a symbol
of support.67 The contribution provisions considered in Buckley are very similar
to the fundraising ban in the AEDPA. Although the limitations on federalcampaign contributions were upheld in Buckley, the complete ban on similar
contributions in the AEDPA probably would not survive Buckley scrutiny.
However, contributions to terrorist organizations might constitutionally be
limited because "[t]he quantity of communication . . . does not increase
perceptibly with the size of... contribution., 68 Nevertheless, such contributions
could not be completely banned without satisfying strict scrutiny or the clearand-present-danger test.
The AEDPA's complete ban on speech in the form of contributions to
particular groups certainly would not satisfy strict scrutiny. As the name implies,
strict scrutiny is a difficult test for the government to overcome. 69 The
government must show that the ban is "necessary to serve a compelling interest
and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."7 °
Since designated groups and their contributors are often expressing
dissatisfaction with the government, 7' much of the speech that would be banned

63. See TerrorismHearings,supranote 7, at 162 (testimony of James X. Dempsey, Deputy
Director, Center for National Security Studies). In his testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, James Dempsey pointed out that the AEDPA would repeal a provision of 18
U.S.C. § 2339A that was adopted in 1994. Section 2339A(c)(2) provides that "[a]n
investigation may not be initiated or continued... based on activities protected by the First
Amendment... including.., the provision of financial supportfor the nonviolent political,
religious, philosophical, or ideological goals or beliefs of any person or group." 18 U.S.C. §
2339A(c)(2).
64. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that the First Amendment
protects the right of association).
65. 424 U.S. I(1976).
66. Id. at 19.
67. See id. at 21.
68. Id.
69. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200 (1991) ("[A] law rarely survives such
scrutiny.").
70. Id at 198 (holding 100-foot campaign-free polling zone constitutional because it was
necessary to serve the compelling right to cast a ballot free of intimidation and fraud); see also
Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1988) (holding total ban on
indecent telephone communications unconstitutional despite compelling interest of protecting
the physical and psychological well-being of minors because such a ban was not the least
restrictive means).
71. See generallyAntonio Cassese, Human Rights andHumanitarianLaw: Terrorism and
Human Rights, 31 AM. U. L. REV.945, 946 (1982) ("[T]errorists are inspired by political
motives and seek to overthrow the existing legal order or to bring about radical change in the
fabric of society.").
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is core political speech. Here, the government is singling out politically
unpopular organizations and mandating that American citizens not express their
support for these organizations through contributions. "If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable."72 This questions whether the government's interest
in ridding the country of terrorist speech is legitimate, much less compelling. The
government is likely to broadly define its interest as protecting the public from
terrorism rather than from terrorist speech. Admittedly, the courts may be more
likely to find the governmental interest sufficiently compelling to satisfy the first
prong of strict scrutiny.
Even assuming that the interests are compelling, the ban on contributions
would not pass the second prong of the strict-scrutiny test, because a total ban
is not the least restrictive means.7 3 First, it is unclear whether every designated
organization will actually use the funds for political dissent. Under the Act, the
4
Secretary of State has the broad power to designate a wide variety of groups
7
with limited safeguards against wrongful designation. " Therefore, many
politically unpopular organizations may be unnecessarily designated simply
because one extreme member, for example, attempted to harm someone with a
firearm. Second, there are other alternatives to limit the negative effects of
terrorism besides banning free speech, especially speech that supports the legal,
peaceful aspects of an organization. The government should rely on the tools it
already possesses to prosecute terrorist attempts and conspiracies instead of this
provision which threatens free speech and could place an individual in jail for ten
years without any showing of intent. The government "has sufficient means at its
disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First Amendment to the
fire. 76
This type of speech also does not fit into the most recent expression of the
category of unprotected speech as set out in
clear-and-present-danger
77
Brandenburgv. Ohio:

72. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
73. "It is not enough to show that the Government's ends are compelling; the means must
be carefully tailored to achieve those ends." Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 (holding that a total ban on
indecent telephone communications unnecessarily restricts adult access to communications
only unsuitable for children). But cf Note, supra note 9, at 2081 (arguing that the AEDPA's
ban is the least restrictive means and therefore constitutional because a lesser restrictive means
such as a cap on funding would not prevent terrorism). In response, I would argue that a ban
would not prevent terrorism either, and the best way to fight terrorism is through constitutional
means. See infra text accompanying note 76.
74. See infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
75. See infranote 104 and accompanying text.
76. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (facially invalidating St. Paul's
Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance in a case where the defendant burned a cross on the yard of
a black family).
77. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism law unconstitutional, and
overturning conviction of Ku Klux Klan leader because the statute punished mere advocacy
without requiring incitement to imminent lawless action).
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[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent
78
lawless action and is likely to incite orproduce such action.

The immediacy element is very strong,79 and, though financial contributions may
make unlawful terrorist activity more likely, it is unlikely that the threat meets

this immediacy test.80 In the majority of cases, an individual's donation will lead
to future illegal action. Therefore, the AEDPA cannot be upheld under this
category of unprotected speech.
Although the AEDPA does not satisfy strict scrutiny or fit into the clear-andpresent-danger category, some may argue that the Act really regulates conduct
and not speech. 8 ' If the contributions can be described as conduct,82 then the
intermediate test of UnitedStates v. O'Brien83 would apply. However, the ban
would still fail because the government interest is not "unrelated to the
suppression of free expression."84

78. Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
79. As early as 1919, Justice Holmes stressed the importance of protecting speech at least
until the threat is imminent:
Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy
based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I
think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression
of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so
imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes
of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
80. The strength of the immediacy requirement can also be seen in Hess v. Indiana,'414
U.S. 105 (1973), which held that the immediacy requirement was not satisfied when the
defendant stated, while facing an angry crowd of antiwar demonstrators, "We'll take the f-ing
streets later." See also Rohr, supra note 35, at 100-01 (describing the emphasis on immediacy).
But see Note, supranote 9, at 2082 (arguing that the AEDPA's ban is facially constitutional,
satisfying the Brandenburgtest).
81. See Note, supra note 9, at 2082-83.
82. In Buckley, the Court found this argument unpersuasive: "The expenditure of money
simply cannot be equated with such conduct as the destruction of a draft card." Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976).
83. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). According to the O'Brientwo-track test,
government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id at 377 (upholding defendant's conviction for willfully and knowingly burning his draft card
because the government's interest in the availability of draft cards was unrelated to the
suppression of speech, and because the law was the only way to prevent destruction).
84. Id at 377; see also 1LA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) ("[N]onverbal
expressive activity can be banned because of the action it entails, but not because of the ideas
it expresses."); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 119 F.3d 1367, 1376 (9th
Cir. 1997) (holding O'Brien inapplicable because fundraising restrictions are in effect contentbased, impermissibly targeting plaintiffs due to group affiliation), petitionfor cert.filed, 66
U.S.L.W. 3523 (U.S. Jan. 30, 1998) (No. 97-1252).
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As one author points out, O'Brien can easily be abused85 because "all laws
restricting freedom of speech are passed because of some 'interest unrelated to
free expression."' 86 Of course, the government promoted the law as a concern for
national security and the threat of terrorism,87 but the question is whether the
reasons for the law are based only on the noncommunicative aspects of the
regulated conduct.88 Buckley answers this question by stating, "[I]t is beyond
dispute that the interest in regulating the alleged 'conduct' of giving.., money
'arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the
conduct is itself thought to be harmful." 89
Proponents of the AEDPA may also argue that the legislation is aimed at the
secondary effects of the contributions, such as money being used for bombs.90
Although this argument may sound persuasive, it does not justify the AEDPA's
complete ban on contributions. This secondary-effects argument has been
persuasive to the Supreme Court in zoning-ordinance cases. 9' In Renton v.
Playtime Theatres,Inc., the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that was designed
to prevent the secondary effects of crime and diminished property values by
prohibiting adult theaters in residential areas.92 The Court held that the
governmental interest was substantial, that the ordinance was narrowly tailored
because it reached only the theaters that produced the secondary effects, and that
the ordinance left open reasonable alternative avenues of communication because
there was still land available in the city.93 Applying this test to the AEDPA, the
government would definitely have a substantial interest, but the Act is not
narrowly tailored to reach only those donations intended to be used for violence.
In addition, alternative avenues are not left open because this is a complete ban.
Therefore, the secondary-effects argument will not save the AEDPA from a First
Amendment attack.
The AEDPA ban not only unconstitutionally burdens free speech, but it also
impinges on the right of association. Under the Act, individuals are forced to
choose between going to jail or not contributing to a designated foreign
organization, even though they may only want to support the legal aims of the

85. See SMOLLA, supranote 38, at 54 ("[O'Brien is] one of the most important free speech
decisions in American history-and also one of the most abused.").
86. Id.
at 58 (emphasis in original) (paraphrasing O'Brien).
87. Congress's first finding under the fundraising provision stated that "international
terrorism is a serious and deadly problem that threatens the vital interests of the United States."
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 301(a)(1), 110
Stat. 1214, 1247.
88. See SMOLLA, supra note 38, at 58.
89. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17 (1976) (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 382 (1968)). The primary purpose of the act in Buckley was to limit the illegal use of
campaign contributions. See i. at 26.
90. See Note, supra note 9, at 2083 (arguing that the government's "true interest lies in
preventing the personal and property damage inflicted by terrorist groups, rather than in
silencing their antigovernment message").
91. See, e.g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
92. See id at 48.
93. See id. at 50-54.
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group.' 4 There is also a risk of a chilling effect on membership in controversial,
nondesignated groups.
When governmental action curtails the fundamental right to associate it is
subject to strict scrutiny. 9 In Buckley, the limitation on campaign contributions
passed strict scrutiny.9 The governmental interest of preventing illegal campaign
fundraising and the appearance of corruption was found to be sufficient. 9 The
Court held that the $1000 limit was closely drawn because it focused on the
problem of large contributions while leaving other means of association open,
such as volunteer service. 9 The AEDPA provision would not fare as well
because, although the interest in preventing terrorism may be sufficient, the
means are not narrowly drawn. The AEDPA imposes a complete ban and does
not realistically leave any other avenues open. The only way for some individuals
to support a foreign organization 9 may be through donating money. The burden
on association here, therefore, is much heavier than in the context of limits on
campaign contributions.
Even more problems arise when the designation provision is considered. The
Secretary of State is given broad discretion to designate foreign terrorist
organizations'"° that at the time may be politically unpopular. Even with the
requirement that the organization engage in terrorist activities,' the class of

94. "A number of complex motivations may impel an individual to align himself with a
particular organization." United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 266 n.16 (1967) (drawing a
distinction between an active member and a passive or inactive member who disagrees or is
unaware of the group's unlawful aims).
95. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,25 (1976) (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
460-61 (1958)).
96. See id. at 29.
97. See id. at 26.
98. See id. at 28.
99. The fact that the AEDPA deals with support for foreign organizations does not change
the analysis. The First Amendment "right of association includes the right of Americans to
associate with foreign organizations." TerrorismHearings,supra note 7, at 161 (testimony of
James X. Dempsey, Deputy Director, Center for National Security Studies) (citing Lamont v.
Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965)).
100. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
302(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1248-50 (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§
1181-1188 (1994)). Section 302(a) provides:
(1) In General-The Secretary is authorized to designate an organization... if the
Secretary finds that(A) the organization is a foreign organization;
(B) the organization engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section
212(a)(3)(B)); and
(C) the terrorist activity... threatens the security of United States nationals or the
national security of the United States.
Id., 110 Stat. at 1249-50.
101. "Terrorist activity" means any activity which is unlawful, where committed or in the
United States, and involves any of the following, or attempting, threatening, or conspiring to
do any of the following: highjacking; hostage taking; violently attacking an internationally
protected person; assassination; and using biological or chemical agents, nuclear devices,
explosives, or firearms with the intent to endanger one or more individuals, or to cause
substantial damage to property. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §
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possible designees is great. 2 Under the AEDPA, "an entire group of people
might be officially classified as a 'terrorist organization' based upon no more
than one unlawful act committed by one of its members."'0 3
The designation provision is further complicated by the fact that in a criminal
action-for example, in a prosecution for violating the fundraising
provision-the defendant is not "permitted to raise any question concerning the
validity of the.., designation as a defense or an objection."' '° This means that
a financial contributor can be sentenced to jail for up to ten years with virtually
no defense. °5
IV. THE AEDPA's TERRORIST AND CRIMINAL ALIENREMOVAL PROCEDURES AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Several of the AEDPA's terrorist and criminal alien-removal provisions raise
serious due-process concerns. Even though these provisions do not affect the
average citizen directly, we all are affected. The legitimacy of our legal system
is put into question whenever basic due-process rights are denied, even when
denied to "undesirable" aliens.'0 6 This Part first determines what rights are due
to a legal resident alien,'0 7 and then applies that analysis to the AEDPA.
It has long been established that a lawful resident alien is protected by the Fifth
Amendment and may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process.' 8 In Kwong Hal Chew v. Colding, the Supreme Court stated,
"[a]lthough Congress may prescribe conditions for [a lawful resident alien's]
expulsion and deportation, not even Congress may expel him without allowing
him a fair opportunity to be heard."'0 9

I182(a)(3)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1997).
102. As Walter Reich stated:
Persons and groups have carried out terrorist acts for at least two thousand years.
During that considerable span of human experience, such acts have been carried
out by an enormously varied range of persons with an enormously varied range
of beliefs in order to achieve an enormously varied range of ends .... [T]he list
we can produce is breathtaking in its variety and scope.
Walter Reich, Understanding Terrorist Behavior: The Limits and Opportunities of
PsychologicalInquiry, in ORIGINS OF TERRORISM 261, 261-62 (Walter Reich ed., 1990).
103. O'Loughlin, supra note 16, at 114.
104. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 302(a), 110 Stat. at 1249. However,
the organization may appeal the designation within 30 days after publication. See id An abuseof-discretion standard of review is applied. See id
105. The defendant cannot challenge the validity of the designation or argue that he was
simply supporting the legal aims of the organization. Therefore, he is left with virtually no
defense except that he did not contribute to the organization at all.
106. See O'Loughlin, supranote 16, at 104.
107. This Part deals only with the rights of lawful, permanent-resident aliens, and makes no
assertions as to the due-process rights of illegal aliens.
108. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953); see also Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-33 (1982) ("[O]nce an alien gains admission to our country and
begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional status changes
accordingly.").
109. See Kwong Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 597-98.
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Although the right to due process in deportation proceedings has been
established, the specific contours of the process due are not as clear. "oWhile not
providing a direct answer, the Court in Landon v. Plasenciaemployed a threefactor balancing
test, the Eldridge test, developed for use in administrative-law
111
areas:
In evaluating the procedures in any case, the courts must consider [1] the
interest at stake for the individual, [2] the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
the interest through the procedures used as well as the probable value of
additional or different procedural safeguards, and [3] the interest of the
government in using the current procedures rather than additional or different
procedures." 2
The AEDPA's alien-terrorist removal procedures clearly violate this test."'
The Act allows the government, at a resident-alien deportation hearing, to present
classified information -in a summary report without revealing the classified
evidence to the alien, while allowing the judge to examine all the evidence." 4 In
addition to this secret evidence provision, unlawfully obtained evidence is

110. See Plasencia,459 U.S. at 34 ("[The constitutional sufficiency of procedures provided
in any situation ...varies with the circumstances.").

111. See id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976)). See generally
Michael Scaperlanda, Are We That Far Gone?: Due Process and Secret Deportation
Proceedings,7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 23, 27-29 (1996); Amanda Masters, Comment, Is
Procedural Due Process in a Remote Processing Center a Contradiction in Terms?
Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 999, 1008 (1996);
Jim Rosenfeld, Note, DeportationProceedingsand Due Processof Law, 26 COLUM. HUM.
RTs. L. REv. 713, 737-49 (1995).
112. Plasencia,459 U.S. at 34-37 (establishing test, discussing the individual's interests, and
then remanding for consideration of other factors).
113. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
401(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1258-68 (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act by adding a
new title V). The Attorney General may seek removal under this new title if "removal under
title II would pose a risk to the national security of the United States." Id., 110 Stat. at 1260
(codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1533(a)(1)(D)(iii) (West Supp. 1997)).
114. See id., 110 Stat. at 1262-63 (codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1534(e)(3)). This provision
provides:
(3) TREATMENT OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.(A) USE.- The judge shall examine, ex parte and in camera, any evidence for
which the Attorney General determines that public disclosure would pose a risk
to the national security of the United States or to the security of any individual
because it would disclose classified information.
(B) SUBMISSION.- With respect to such information, the Government shall
submit to the removal court an unclassified summary of the specific evidence that
does not pose that risk.
(C) APPROVAL.- Not later than 15 days after submission, the judge shall
approve the summary if the judge finds that it is sufficient to enable the alien to
prepare a defense. The Government shall deliver to the alien a copy of the
unclassified summary approved under this subparagraph.
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admissible against a resident alien."' This means that a legal resident alien, who
has been convicted of no crime, can be deported based on illegally obtained and
secret evidence.
By denying an alien the right to know all the evidence against him, the
government is violating a fundamental element of due process, the right to
confrontation." 6 Although he is entitled to an unclassified summary, he is still
precluded from cross-examining the witness. It is also unclear how detailed the
summary must be. The AEDPA states only that "the judge shall approve the
summary if the judge finds that it is sufficient to enable the alien to prepare a
defense..... The quality of defense is not addressed, and it is reasonable to
believe that the defense will not be as "sufficient" as would be a defense based
on full disclosure. The disparity is made clearer by the fact that the government's
burden of proof is only a preponderance of the evidence."'
The Act does make one minor concession by providing counsel to any alien
financially unable to obtain representation." 9 This comes at the expense of much
needed evidence and is not a sufficient trade-off. In Judge Friendly's list of
elements of a fair hearing, the right to call witnesses (#4), the right to know the
evidence against one (#5), and the right to have the decision based solely on the
evidence presented (#6), are all ranked higher than the right to counsel (#7)." °
With these due-process concerns in mind, the Plasenciathree-factor test will
now be applied to the AEDPA. The first factor is the individual's interest at
stake, and the failure to safeguard the individual's interest is undeniably a "great
deprivation of liberty.'' In Plasencia, the Court described the interest as
"without question, a weighty one."'" The Court continued: "She stands to lose
the right 'to stay and live and work in this land of freedom.' Further, she may
lose the right to rejoin her immediate family, a right that ranks high among the
interests of the individual."'"
The second factor (risk of error) is great, and the value of additional procedural
safeguards is obvious. As stated earlier, the provision of counsel when needed
does not fully compensate for the loss of the right to confrontation and the
inability to provide the best defense possible. As one author points out, "Any

115. See id, 110 Stat. at 1262 (codified at 8 U.S.C.A § 1534(e)(1)(B)). "[A]n alien subject
to removal under this title shall not be entitled to suppress evidence that the alien alleges was
unlawfully obtained.... Id
116. See Scaperlanda, supra note 111, at 25-26.
117. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 401(a), 110 Stat. at 1262 (codified at
8 U.S.C.A. § 1534(e)(3)(C)).
118. See idt, 110 Stat. at 1263 (codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1534(g)).
119. See id, 110 Stat. at 1261 (codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1534(c)(1)). Typically, aliens are
not provided with counsel at the government's expense during deportation proceedings. See
Scaperlanda, supra note 111, at 29.
120. See Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1279-95
(1977). Friendly advocated, "[i]f an agency chooses to go further than is constitutionally
demanded with respect to one item, this may afford good reason for diminishing or even
eliminating another." Id at 1279.
121. Rosenfeld, supra note 111, at 744.
122. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
123. Id. (citations omitted).
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student of our immigration history ought to find the prospect of secret
immigration proceedings cause for grave concern.' 1 24 For example, UnitedStates

ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy'25 and Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei 126 involved secret immigration proceedings, for reasons of "national
security," where the exclusions were later (one and three years after detention,
respectively) found to be baseless or insignificant to national security. 27
The final factor, the governmental interest in maintaining the secrecy of
classified information, is strong, 2 1 but, as discussed above, information does not
always end up being as dangerous to national security as originally presented.
Considering the "repeated, excessive deprivations of individual liberty that have
been executed in the name of 'national security,' healthy skepticism is called for
whenever this interest is invoked by legislators."' 129 Therefore, the government's
interest in keeping evidence secret from the alien, except in extreme cases, does
not outweigh the individual's interests, particularly when coupled with the risk
and history of error."'
These alien-deportation proceedings appear even more unjust when the alien's
deportation is based simply on membership in a designated organization.'' The
AEDPA effectively resurrects the doctrine of guilt by association. Aliens can
now be deported for association with the peaceful aims of an organization, rather
than only deported for their own illegal conduct.3 2 In 1990, the Immigration

Reform Act specifically repealed guilt by association'

by allowing deportation

34
only upon a showing of actual participation in terrorist activity.

124. Scaperlanda, supra note 111, at 27.
125. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
126. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
127. See Scaperlanda, supra note I 11, at 27-28; see also GELLHORN, supra note 47, at 14143.
128. It has been argued that without the ability to keep information secret, law enforcement
is hindered, and that if information and sources of information are kept classified, some
deportation proceedings might not be brought against terrorists. See Scaperlanda, supra note
111, at 29.
129. Rosenfeld, supranote 111, at 747.
130. See id at 748-49. "Secrecy should be the exception rather than the rule." Id at 749. The
government should at the very least be required to show that secrecy is necessary to prevent
a substantialrisk.
131. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
41 1(1)(c), 110 Stat. 1214, 1268-69 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i) (1994)), adds to the
list of excludable aliens "a member of a foreign terrorist organization, as designated by the
Secretary." Defining an alien as excludable, in effect, also defines the alien as deportable. See
8 U.S.C. § 1227 (providing that any excludable alien shall be immediately deported).
132. See TerrorismHearings,supra note 7, at 160-61 (testimony of James X. Dempsey,
Deputy Director, Center for National Security Studies).
133. See id. at 160.
134. See Keisha A. Gary, Note, CongressionalProposalsto Revive Guilt by Association:
An Ineffective Plan to Stop Terrorism, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 227, 239 (1994).
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In addition to the secret-evidence provision, the criminal alien-removal
provision of the AEDPA also contains possible due-process violations. 3
Montero v. Cobb sets out the major changes:
Along with increasing the number of crimes for which an alien can be
deported, it mandates the detention of serious criminal aliens during the
course of their deportation hearings. Prior to the 1996 amendment, section
which had broadened the
1252(a)(2) contained a number of exceptions
6
availability of bond detention hearings."
There is no longer an exception for aliens who establish that they are not a threat
to the community and that there is a strong likelihood that they will appear at
future hearings.'
A resident alien recently challenged this mandatory-detention provision in a
petition for habeas corpus. 3 In DeMelo v. Cobb, while "not undertaking to
decide the constitutional issues at th[e] time,""' the court spent a great deal of
the opinion discussing the constitutional issues. The court stated: "[A]pplication
of a putative prohibition against any exercise of discretion by the Attorney
General to allow DeMelo's release on bond, pending a hearing regarding
deportation, raises serious due process issues.,'"4
CONCLUSION
The course Congress and the President chose in enacting the AEDPA is not
"the course of a strong, free, secure people, but that of the frightened, the
insecure, the intolerant."'' Obviously learning nothing from the past, they have
responded to "the last atrocity" by resurrecting criminal prohibitions on protected

135. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 440(c), 110 Stat. at 1277
(amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)). The Act provides:
The Attorney General shall take into custody any alien convicted of any criminal
offense covered in section 125 1(a)(2)(A)(iii) [aggravated felony], (B) [possession
of controlled substances], (C) [certain firearm offenses], or (D) [miscellaneous
crimes, e.g., espionage, sabotage, sedition, selective service violations] of this
title, or any offense covered by section 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) of this title [conviction
of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude] for which both predicate
offenses are covered by section 1251(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title [classifying crimes
of moral turpitude committed within certain time periods after the date of entry
as deportable offenses], upon release of the alien from incarceration, shall deport
the alien as expeditiously as possible.... IT]he Attorney General shall not release
such felon from custody.
Montero v. Cobb, 937 F. Supp. 88, 89 n.1 (D. Mass. 1996) (all but last alteration in original;
italicization in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) as amended by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act § 440(c)).
136. Montero, 937 F. Supp. at 92 n.5.
137. See id

138. See DeMelo v. Cobb, 936 F. Supp. 30 (D. Mass. 1996), vacatedas moot, 108 F.3d 328
(Ist Cir. 1997).
139. Id. at 34.
140. Id at 32. The court also discussed a resident alien's right to due process. See id.; see
also supratext accompanying notes 107-11.
concurring).
141. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 532 (1958) (Black, J.,
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forms of speech, the doctrine of guilt by association, and violations of due
process in deportation proceedings. Today's suppression goes even further than
the country's earlier reactions to Communism. There is virtually no limit to the
number of unpopular groups, often including innocent, law-abiding citizens and
alien residents, that can be affected by the AEDPA. 4 ' Once again, in the words
of Justice Black, "[w]hen the practice of outlawing
parties and various public
143
groups begins, no one can say where it will end."'

142. One may find temporarysolace in the fact that as of the writing of this Note, well over
a year after the AEDPA became law, the Secretary of State had not yet designated a single
organization. But, Congress is getting impatient and 42 members have protested the delay, with
one member claiming that the delay has made the Act "toothless." A.M. Rosenthal, Slow on
Terror,NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 10, 1997, at B7 (reporting that Rep. Charles
Schumer threatened to withhold a significant part of the State Department's budget if the list
were not made public by September).
Several possible reasons for this delay exist. The State Department blames the delay on the
preparation of briefs of justification to ensure each designation can stand up to judicial
scrutiny. See Elizabeth A. Palmer, Lawmakers Press TerrorismIssue; Secretary ofState Urged
to Designate Foreign Groups, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), July 20, 1997, at 4A,
available in 1997 WL 6846850.
One other possible explanation that has been argued is "domestic political concerns...
especially a concern that the law might require the United States to label the Irish Republican
Army as a terrorist organization. That could antagonize many Irish-Americans and complicate
U.S. efforts to promote the peace process in Northern Ireland." Id.
143. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S.
1, 145 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).

